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ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF CONSTRUCTING
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS
In re Detroit Edison Co., Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH)
20,035 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 26, 1976)
In allocating the loss caused by the cancellation of a utility's power
plant construction, the Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC)
adopted a standard that inadequately protects consumer and investor
interests. In deciding who should bear the cost of a cancelled construc-
tion project, the PSC failed to consider whether investors were being
paid to bear the risk of cancellation and instead looked only to the
foreseeability of the event causing the loss.'
Relying on its demand forecast for 1980,2 Detroit Edison, an electric
utility company, began planning construction in 1971 for a nuclear
power plant.3 After spending $6,810,199 for planning, the company
decided to cancel the project4 in 1974, because it could not raise
satisfactory financing in the depressed financial markets; new forecasts
lowered the expected demand for 1980; and subsequent Atomic Energy
Commission regulations added $300,000,000 to the projected cost of
the new plant. 5 An administrative law judge approved Detroit Edison's
request to treat the cost of the cancelled project as an extraordinary
property loss, an account charged to consumers.6 The PSC heard
exceptions, affirmed, and held: If unforeseeable events cause the cancel-
lation of a reasonable and prudent utility construction project, the utility
may, for accounting purposes, amortize and charge the cost of the
project to operating expenses as an extraordinary property loss.7
Public utilities are natural monopolies." State commissions with
1. In re Detroit Edison Co., Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,035, at 16,223 (Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 26, 1976).
2. Id. at 16,221.
3. Id. at 16,222.
4. Id. at 16,221.
5. Id. at 16,222, 16,225.
6. Id. at 16,221-22.
7. Id. at 16.223-24.
8. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. City of Trenton, 509 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974) (government regulation substitutes regulated monopoly for destructive com-
petition); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 523-24 (10th ed.
1976); J. SUELFLOW, PUBLIC UnLrry ACCOUNTING: THEORY AND APPLICATION 1-15
(1973).
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jurisdiction over utilities engaged in intrastate sales9 establish rates and
regulate utilities to insure that investors receive a fair return on their
investments and consumers do not pay oppressive rates.'0 The commis-
sion first selects a test period during which it compiles information to
determine the utility's operating expenses and rate base."1 In addition
to variable costs such as fuel and labor, operating expenses include
capital-related costs such as depreciation, which represents the amount
of long-lived assets used up during the year, and-if applicable-amor-
tization of extraordinary property loss.12 The primary component in the
rate base is property-in-service, which represents the net fixed invest-
ment in the utility.'" The commission then sets the maximum rate of
return a utility may earn on its rate base. The rate of return should be
sufficient to enable the utility to maintain financial integrity, attract new
9. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6, 10 (1917); Portland Ry. Light &
Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 229 U.S. 397, 410 (1913); Honolulu Rapid Transit &
Land Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282, 290, 291 (1908); Hi-Ball Transit Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 27 F.2d 425, 427 (N.D. Tex. 1928); California Motor Transport Co. v.
Railroad Com'n, 30 Cal. 2d 184, 187, 180 P.2d 912, 913-14 (1947); In re Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R., 152 Neb. 352, 355, 41 N.W.2d 157, 160 (1950); West Jersey & S.S. R.R. v.
Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 8 N.J. Misc. 212, 214, 149 A 269, 270 (Sup. Ct. 1930),
aff'd sub nom. Atlantic City R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 109 N.J.L. 260, 160
A. 491 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Commonwealth, 199
Va. 797, 804, 102 S.E.2d 339, 344-45 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 171
(1959). Cf. State ex reL Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 337 Mo. 809,
824, 85 S.W.2d 890, 897 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 657 (1936) (state commission
lacks jurisdiction over interstate commerce in natural gas). See also Michigan Cent. R.
R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 615 (1915).
10. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1974); FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 465-66 (1973); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 603 (1944); Rhode Island Consumer's Council v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951); Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (D.S.C.
1973), aff'd mem., 415 U.S. 969 (1974); City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F. Supp. 594,
607 n.46 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified on other grounds, 471 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1973);
General Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 Mich. 620, 631, 67 N.W.2d 882, 887
(1954); Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 26, 50 N.W.2d 826.
834 (1952); City of Detroit v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 308 Mich. 706, 716, 14
N.W.2d 784, 784-85 (1944); In re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 PuB. U. REP. (PUR)
3d 289, 293 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); cf. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases
v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 435 (5th Cir. 1970).
11. Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUIBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 45 (1969).
12. See notes 25-35 infra and accompanying text.
13. 1 A. PRIEsT, supra note 11, at 139.
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capital, and compensate its investors for the use of their capital and for
assuming risks. 4 Operating expenses added to the product of the rate
base multiplied by the rate of return equals the maximum allowable
revenue for the future operating period.' 5
The process of setting just and reasonable rates requires a careful
balancing of the adverse interests of investors and consumers. 16 In-
creasing the value of the utility's property-in-service benefits investors by
increasing, in two ways, the utility's maximum allowable revenue. Since
property-in-service is included in the rate base, the return on investment,
i.e. the dividend,' 7 will increase as the value of property-in-service
increases. Furthermore, a larger property-in-service account will in-
crease the utility's return of investment, i.e. the depreciation expense1s
Conversely, consumers attempt to limit the value of property-in-service
and decrease the utility's earnable revenues, thereby reducing consumer
rates.
Each commission adopts and requires utilities to use a uniform system
of accounts" to ensure that the financial information used at rate
14. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923); 1 A. PRInsr, supra note 11, at
191-93.
15. E.g., Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sioux City, 256 Iowa 547, 551, 128 N.W.2d 248,
250 (1964); State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Mo. 1957); City of
Weslaco v. General Tel. Co., 359 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). See also J.
FOSTER & B. RODEY, PUBLIC UTaLrIY ACCOUNTING 45-47 (1951); Cook, Abandoned
Propert y and the Rate Base, 17 AccouNliNG REv. 243, 243 (1943).
16. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952
(1951); City of Detroit v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 308 Mich. 706, 716, 14 N.W.2d
784, 784-85 (1944).
17. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Bebehick v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Boston
Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., - Mass. -, -, 324 N.E.2d 372, 375-76 (1975);
In re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 9 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 433, 435 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1955).
18, In re San Diego Transit Sys., 4 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 129, 137 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1954); Washington Pub. Serv. Comnim'n v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 32
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 355, 359 (Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); J. SUELFLOW, supra
note 8, at 73; cf. Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 195 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963). See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
19. J. SUELFLOW, supra note 8, at 32-55; e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States,
231 U.S. 423, 440-41 (1913); ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 210 (1912);
FPC Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Class A and B Utilities, 18 C.F.R. pts.
101-25 (1976); MICH. AD. CODE § 460.3000 (Supp. 1960). See also, Cook, supra note
15, at 248-50.
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hearings is consistent and accurate.20  Some accounts record extraordin-
ary transactions,21 such as extraordinary property loss, and cannot be
used absent the commission's approval.22 A commission will issue an
accounting order approving the use of such an account if the transaction
meets the technical requirements of the uniform system of accounts, 23
and use of the account would adequately balance adverse interests.24
Michigan's uniform system of accounts permits the use of an extraor-
dinary property loss account upon satisfaction of three conditions. First,
the property must be property-in-service, 25 owned and used by the
utility to produce electricity. 6 Property-in-service includes only reason-
able and prudent investments, leaving investors to suffer the loss
on unreasonable investment decisions.2 7  In general, the property must
also be "used and useful" in order to qualify; investments no longer
"used and useful" cannot remain in the property-in-service account.28
20. Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 440-41 (1913); In re Indiana
& Mich. Elec. Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 470, 472 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1955); 1. Fos-R & B. RODEY, supra note 15, at 27.
21. E.g., MicH. An. CODE § 460.3182 (Supp. 1960); J. FOSTER & B. RODEY, supra
note 15, at 179; J. SUELPLOW, supra note 8, at 72.
22. E.g., MicH. AD. CODE § 460.3182 (Supp. 1960).
23. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 504 F.2d 225, 228-29 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 913 (1963); Boone County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Indiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 239 Ind. 525, 532, 159 N.E.2d 121, 124 (1959); Michigan Consol. Gas
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 389 Mich. 624, 641, 209 N.W.2d 210, 216 (1973); City of
Ishpeming v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 370 Mich. 293, 315, 121 N.W.2d 462, 472
(1963).
24. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944); Democratic Cent.
Comm. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 485 F.2d 786, 806 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188
F.2d 11, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951); Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 237 Miss. 157, 241, 113 So. 2d 622, 656
(1959).
25. MicH. An. CODE § 460.3182 (Supp. 1960).
26. Id. § 460.3101 (Supp. 1960).
27. Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 51-52, 58-59, 86
N.W.2d 657, 664-65, 668-69 (1957); City of Sullivan v. Missouri Elec. Power Co., 6
Pun. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 225, 244 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934); In re British
Columbia Elec. Ry., 53 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 438, 453-54 (B.C. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1943); cf. Pavilion Natural Gas Co. v. Maltbie, 268 App. Div. 610, 618, 52
N.Y.S.2d 915, 921 (1944).
28. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938); In re
Jacksonville Gas Corp., 40 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 372, 374 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1961); In re Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 27 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 209,
229 (IM. Commerce Comm'n 1959); In re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 PuB. U. RE .
(PUR) 3d 289, 295-96 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn 1960); In re Tri-County Tel. Co.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/8
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On the other hand, state commissions often include construction work
in progress in the rate base without determining whether it is property-
in-service.2 The Michigan PSC includes work in progress on the
ground that the funds "are by definition already committed to providing
service, even though the plant may not actually be in service. .... 30
The second requirement is that the utility must retire property from
service, either partially or completely. 81 Finally, the event responsible
for retirement must be one that management could not have reasonably
foreseen and provided for."
A utility which suffers an extraordinary property loss must eliminate
the investment from the rate base,33 but can amortize and charge
the loss to operating expenses. Although investors lose the right
to a further return on investment,34 the utility passes the loss on to
consumers and retains the right to a return of investment. Consumers
1930A PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 348, 351 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1929); In re City of
Monroe, 1923D PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 276, 290-91 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1923);
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341 Mo. 920, 969-70,
110 S.W.2d 749, 776 (1937), appeal dismissed, 304 U.S. 398 (1938); New Jer-
sey Suburban Water Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 123 N.J.L. 303, 313-14, 8
A.2d 350, 356 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); In re Public Serv. Co., 33 Pun. U. REP. (PUR)
3d 398, 404 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1960); Washington Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Northwest
Natural Gas Co., 32 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 355, 360 (Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1960); In re Northern States Power Co., 83 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 176, 181 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Cook, supra note 15, at 243; cf. In re Ansonia Water Co., 66
PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 517, 517-18 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966); In re Honolulu
Rapid Transit Co., 40 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 140, 152-53 (Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n
1961 ) (intangible property excluded from rate base).
29. In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525, 533-34, 149 A.2d 324, 329 (1959);
In re Detroit Edison Co., 88 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 68, 72 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1970); In re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 83 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 301, 302 (Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 24 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d
109, 111 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958); In re Michigan Associated Tel. Co., 88 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 15, 17 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951); In re Tri-County Tel.
Co., 1930A PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 348, 351 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1929); Pennsyl-
vania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 5 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 202, 213-14
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974). Contra, Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., -
Mass. -, -, 324 N.E.2d 372, 372-79 (1975); In re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 93 PUB.
U. REP. (PUR) 3d 106, 109 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972).
30. In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 467, 472-73 (Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
31. MIcH. AD. CODE § 460.3182 (Supp. 1960).
32. Id.
33. But see Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., - Mass. -, -, 324
N.E.2d 372, 378-79 (1975).
34. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
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seek to deny utilities the use of an extraordinary property loss account
and force them to absorb the loss in their capital surplus.8"
State commissions are responsible for balancing these adverse inter-
ests of consumers and investors.36 Several commissions have adopted a
risk compensation standard to accomplish this task. 7 This standard
recognizes that a portion of the rate of return3 s compensates investors
for assuming the risks of doing business, including unforeseen cancella-
tion of reasonable projects.3 9 To the extent investors have been paid to
35. In re Southern Gas Co., 92 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 199, 201 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1971) (retired manufactured gas plant); In re Jacksonville Gas Corp., 40 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR) 3d 372, 374-75 (Fla. R. R. & Pub. Util, Comm'n 1961) (same); In re,
North Shore Gas Co., 62 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 150, 151-53 (In. Commerce
Comm'n 1946) (retired coke oven gas plant); In re Consumer Power Co., No. F-700, at
8-9 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 10, 1975) (cancelled construction project); In rel
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 22 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 369, 372, 316-77 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1958) (retired manufactured gas plant); Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of
Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 48, 86 N.W.2d 657, 659 (1947) (retired streetcar opera-
tion); it re Public Serv. Co., 33 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 398, 404 (N.C. Util. Comm'n
1960) (retired manufactured gas plant); In re Northern States Power Co., 30 PuB. U.
REP. (PUR) 3d 248, 250 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959) (retired liquified petroleum
plant); City of Racine v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 100 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.)
467, 473, 475 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953) (retired manufactured gas plant).
36. Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 456-57 (1913); Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. United States, 52 F.2d 967, 970 (W.D. Va. 1931), afId, 287 U.S. 134
(1932); In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525, 532-33, 149 A.2d 324, 328-29
(1959).
37. Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 194-95 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 17-20
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951); Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of
Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 58, 86 N.W.2d 657, 668 (1957); City of Racine v.
Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 100 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 467, 474 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1953); Note, Accounting for Extraordinary Obsolescence, 65 HARv. L. REV.
1431, 1441-43 (1952).
38. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
39. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944); Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923);
Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
913 (1963); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge,
248 Iowa 1201, 1234-35, 85 N.W.2d 28, 47-48 (1957); Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v.
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 37-38, 50 N.W.2d 826, 839 (1952);
Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 54, 86 N.W.2d 657, 665-66
(1957); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 237 Miss. 157,
240-41, 113 So. 2d 622, 656 (1959); City of Sullivan v. Missouri Elec. Power Co., 6
PuB. U. REP. (PUR) (n.s.) 225, 244 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934); In re New Jersey
Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 533-35, 89 A.2d 26, 43-44 (1952); Washington Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Northwestern Natural Gas Co., 32 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 355, 360
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take such risks, they should assume the occasional loss.4" Commissions
applying this standard to extraordinary obsolescence have allocated loss
entirely to the investor,4 1 evenly between the consumer and the in-
vestor,42 and fully to consumers when they had benefited from lower
rates." The Michigan PSC, however, has not applied a risk compen-
sation analysis to losses caused by extraordinary obsolescence 4 or extra-
ordinary property loss of construction work in progress.4 Instead,
the commission has considered primarily the foreseeability of the loss. 46
In In re Detroit Edison Co.,47 a succinctly worded opinion, the
Michigan PSC found that the events which caused the cancellation of
the construction project were highly extraordinary and unforeseeable.4
The PSC held that management's decisions to build and later to cancel
the construction were reasonable, 49 and concluded that Detroit Edison
could treat the project as an extraordinary property loss and amortize
the cost."0
The Michigan PSC's decision in Detroit Edison was legally and
conceptually flawed. The PSC's legal analysis permitted extraordinary
property loss treatment for construction work in progress without dis-
cussing whether the construction investment constitutes property-in-
service, a necessary prerequisite for such treatment.r' The inclusion of
(Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); 1 A. PRIEsT, supra note 11 at 202; Freeman, An
"Enlightened Judgment" Approach to Rate of Return, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1380, 1392
(1948).
40. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951).
41. Cf. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341 Mo. 920, 967-68,
110 S.W.2d 749, 775 (1937), appeal dismissed, 304 U.S. 398 (1938); Iowa-Illinois Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 1234-35, 85 N.W.2d 28, 47-48 (1957).
42. Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 63, 86 N.W.2d 657,
671 (1957).
43. City of Racine v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 100 Pun. U. R P. (PUR) (n.s.)
467, 475 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953).
44. In re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 289 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1960).
45. In re Consumers Power Co., No. F-700 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 10,
1975).
46. Id. See In re Detroit Edison Co., Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,035, at 16,223
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 26, 1976); id. at 16,226 (Rails, Comm'r, dissenting).
47. Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,035 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 26, 1976).
48. Id. at 16,223.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16,224.
51. Micl. AD. CODE § 460.3182 (Supp. 1960). See notes 25-30 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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construction work in progress in the rate base is not dispositive; the
rationale for that result is that construction funds are necessarily com-
mitted to providing future service, 2 a rationale plainly inapposite to
extraordinary loss incurred by cancellation of a project. In calculating
the rate base, it is reasonable to assume that a construction project will
be completed; the question is not whether consumers should pay, but
when. By contrast, when utilities seek extraordinary property loss
treatment for abandoned projects that will never be completed, the
problem is not one of timing but of allocating the loss between consum-
ers and investors. The PSC did not consider this distinction in allowing
extraordinary property loss treatment for cancelled construction, even
though consumers must pay only for extraordinary loss to property-in-
service. 53
The PSC's decision to focus on the foreseeability of the event causing
the property loss, 54 rather than the risk compensation standard,
was also conceptually inadequate. The risk of extraordinary prop-
erty loss must be allocated between the consumer and the investor.
Investors have a right to compensation for assuming the risks of
doing business; they should bear the loss to the extent that the rate of
return compensates them for having done so.'" The foreseeability
requirement and the risk compensation standard will not necessarily
allocate the risks in the same way. The rate of return may be so low
that it fails to compensate investors for assuming all of the foreseeable
risks, or it may be high enough to compensate them for assuming
unforeseeable risks. Regardless of how high the commission sets the rate
of return, however, the PSC would still require consumers to bear unfore-
seeable risks. Accordingly, the foreseeability requirement would often
allocate the risk to the wrong party. This approach protects neither
investors nor consumers and should be abandoned.
The risk compensation approach is theoretically appealing, since it
strikes a balance between the adverse consumer and investor interests.
The PSC first calculates the risk of loss and determines what rate of
52. In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 467, 472-73 (Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970). See also Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., -
Mass. -, -, 324 N.E.2d 372, 379 (1975).
53. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
56. Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n,
485 F.2d 786, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
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return would adequately compensate investors for having assumed it. It
must then isolate the actual compensation corresponding to this risk
from the return on investment paid to investors. If the actual compen-
sation is as great as the adequate compensation, the investor must bear
the loss; if not, it falls upon the consumer. Unfortunately, the risk
allocation approach presents difficulties in application. Commissions
may find it impossible to determine accurately in retrospect what portion
of the rate of return was attributable to the investor's assumption of risk.
A possible solution would be to identify and allocate the risk prospec-
tively before it is assumed." ' Before beginning a given construction
project, the PSC could inform the financial markets that investors would
bear any loss caused by changes in the demand for electricity (or any
other risk). The PSC could note how the financial market discounts
this additional risk and then use the information in calculating the rate
of return at subsequent rate hearings. Prospective risk allocation, how-
ever, may also present difficulties in application since it assumes that all
public utilities will have access to large financial markets, that these
markets will efficiently perceive and discount additional risks as they are
introduced, and that management will abandon unprofitable projects
knowing that cancellation will cause certain loss to investors. 5e Despite
these practical difficulties, prospective risk allocation is preferable to a
foreseeability approach because it attempts to balance risk and compen-
sation.
Longer construction lead times and increased governmental regula-
tion have introduced more uncertainties into utility construction. 9 Since
construction costs are higher, the utility stands to lose more. If the PSC
intends to allocate these risks between consumers and investors, it must
develop a standard that protects the interests of both consumers and
investors, and is amenable to practical application. The foreseeability
requirement fails to protect and balance these adverse interests. The
commission must develop a practical method of applying the risk com-
pensation approach."0
57. Cf. In re Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 95 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) 3d 498 (F.P.C.
1972) (future rate base treatment conditioned upon success of project).
58. But see Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., - Mass. -- , -, 324
N.E.2d 372, 376 (1975) (exclusion from rate base should not dissuade utility from
retiring obsolete plant).
59. Why Utilities Can't Build, NATION's Bus., Sept. 1975, at 75-76; Virginia Electric
Suspends Work on Nuclear Units, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
60. The risk compensation approach need not be limited to cancelled construction
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If these practical difficulties cannot be overcome, commissions should
consider abandoning attempts to allocate risk between consumers and
investors. The consumers could bear all risk of loss and pay to the
investor only the lowest, risk-free rate of return.01
projects. It is a conceptually attractive method for treating any property-in-service held
by a utility subject to extraordinary loss or obsolescence.
61. The risk-free rate of return is that return on an investment paid by a
business having no risk of default on its payments. A United States government security
is a risk-free investment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/8
